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TIMING, FRAGILITY AND CHILDREN'S LAW
ROBERT V. HANNAFORD*
Last April, Ripon College's ABA Family Law Section conference,
"Family Law and the 'Best Interests of the Child,' " focused on two fun-
damental questions: (1) what elements of family life are most important
to children's moral development and (2) how are these elements rele-
vant to family law and public policy? Although these questions could
not be fully answered in any conference, they suggest that law and pub-
lic policy should aim to protect and secure those elements most impor-
tant to children's moral development. The discussion of children's
moral development was unusually productive during the conference and
produced legally relevant questions regarding the importance of under-
standing the elements of children's moral development.
Pediatric psychiatrists, clinical and experimental psychologists and
moral theorists presented evidence and arguments which supported this
basic point: Caretakers must treat infants as responsive and concerned
for others and give consistent and loving nurturing if children are to
attain a sense of identity and self-esteem. Otherwise, children will lack
the means for communicating and establishing relations with others and
for determining how to control their own impulses. If children lack these
qualities, they are more likely to become delinquents. Moreover, care-
takers should themselves be morally concerned and responsive so that
children's moral development is enhanced by example and guidance. In
sum, children need loving, consistent caretakers who provide an exam-
ple of acting with respectful concern for others and who place moral
demands and expectations on them from infancy onward.
Although conference participants continued pressing for their indi-
vidual cherished views of family as the best means to secure the essential
elements of children's moral development, a consensus as to what those
elements are soon formed. This consensus owed a great deal to the gen-
eral agreement of observers from a variety of disciplines regarding a
new awareness of the importance of the elements of timing and fragility
to children's moral responsiveness. Until recently, both lawyers and
moral development theorists spoke and acted as if our treatment of in-
fants and toddlers made no great difference to their moral development.
For example, lawyers often spoke of children's "best interests" as if they
were property rights, treating children as if they were chattels disposed
of strategically in divorce settlements.
At the same time, child development theorists, such as Jean Piaget
and Lawrence Kohlberg, proceeded from the assumption that toddlers
and infants were egoistically self-absorbed. These theorists believed
Professor of Philosophy, Ripon College.
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that infants and toddlers had neither concern for, nor the ability to un-
derstand, others' intentions and purposes.' In Piaget's highly influential
study of the language of Swiss pre-school children, he asserted that the
young child does "not attempt to place himself at the point of view of his
hearer," for the child's egoism is "complete and unconscious." '2 In an-
other study, Piaget argued an infant's perception cannot differentiate
one person from the rest of the world.3 To Piaget and Kohlberg, tod-
dlers' "moral responses" are little more than mere expressions of feel-
ings. 4 From Piaget's and Kohlberg's assumptions, it follows that
children must be amoral and exploitative until they develop new intel-
lectual capacities and broader interests. These most influential studies
of children led to the general belief that it would be a mistake-it would
be unscientific-to treat pre-schoolers as sensitive and responsive to
others' interests or needs. Any efforts to begin early work toward in-
fants' and toddlers' moral development would be wasted.
Conference participants provided abundant evidence and reasons
for calling Piaget's and Kohlberg's assumptions into question. For ex-
ample, conference participants provided evidence that an infant (1) no-
ticed when its caretaker showed concern; (2) responded with delight to
loving attention; (3) failed to thrive when no concern was shown and (4)
followed and responded to the caretakers' intent in simple interactions.
How could this be if the Piaget-Kohlberg account had been correct?
These and other observations called into question the accounts of Piaget
and Kohlberg and showed how moral development is crucially depen-
dent on the early care and treatment of infants and toddlers.
This Article focuses on the philosophical arguments drawn from ac-
tion theorists, which call into question the assumptions of Piaget and
Kohlberg regarding children's moral development. 5 Action theorists
study how beliefs, desires and intentions are involved in human action,
including communication and language use. Action theorists' work im-
1. Jean Piaget, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (Marjorie Gabain trans.
1955). Kohlberg patterns his six stages of moral development after the stages presented
by Piaget. Kohlberg's definition of stage one of moral development, which characterizes
responses of youngsters up to age 10, holds that for persons in this stage: "There is no
differentiation between the moral value of life and its physical or social status value." 1
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 118 (1981). Even his
stage two is described as a case in which the "[v]alue of a human life is seen as instrumen-
tal to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or others." Id. However, this is a posi-
tion that Kohlberg does not hold with complete consistency; he also states that "[a]t every
stage, children perceive basic values such as the value of human life and are able to em-
pathize and take the roles of other people and other living things." Id. at 143. Still, his
repeated theme is that young children act only out of self-concern and respond only to the
threat of punishment at the earlier two stages. Moreover, he urges that it is a mistake to
attempt to treat children at the earlier stages as if they were capable of responding out of
empathic concern. A number of people offered decisive criticism of this position in the
conference. See MICHAEL PRITCHARD, ON BECOMING RESPONSIBLE (1991).
2. See generally Piaget, supra note 1.
3. See generally JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1958).
4. 1 KOHLBERG, supra note 1, at 118.
5. My focus will be on philosophical arguments drawn from action theorists. A de-




plies awareness of, and concerned responsiveness to, others' intentions
and actions are conceptually necessary to a toddler's moral develop-
ment. Current psychological observations support the argument of ac-
tion theorists that this responsiveness, or attentive concern for others, is
fundamental to our moral anatomy and is with us from earliest infancy.
Observers from various disciplines agree that a child's moral responsive-
ness is dependent on the quality of attention given to its moral
development.
These new philosophical arguments rest on the conception that
morally responsible people are accountable and responsive to others.
By this conception, a morally responsible person must: (1) be able to
give an account of his or her actions; (2) have acquired moral language
by which to describe actions; (3) be able to describe motives and ascribe
them to others; (4) be able to give acceptable moral reasons for actions
and (5) be prepared to act in ways that are morally permissible or re-
quired. 6 Thus, at the center of our moral development is responsive
concern, or the capacity to respond to another person out of interest
and concern. These five characteristics of a morally responsive person
will be considered in turn.
The first characteristic concerns accountability and holds that a re-
sponsible person is able to account for his or her actions as well as an-
swer questions and give reasons for these actions. In order to do this, a
responsible person must be able to describe actions in language under-
stood in the community, recognize what others include in the descrip-
tion and know particular actions belong under that description.7 This is
a conceptual, not an empirical, point: To be accountable (by our com-
mon understanding of the notion), an individual must know how to de-
scribe actions and, to be responsible, must also aim to achieve some
result when engaged in voluntary action.
The second characteristic concerns the ability to view one's actions
as similar to those of other community members. As pointed out by P.F.
Strawson, in order to describe one's own actions, one must be able to
ascribe the same intent to oneself as one ascribes to others. States of
consciousness can only be ascribed to others by identifying others as
subjects of experience and possessors of states of consciousness. 8
There must be some identifiable, observable criteria to ascribe states of
consciousness if language is to be intelligible for people generally, or if
intentions or subjective states are to be communicated. As Donald Da-
vidson noted, individuals must describe their own purposes and situa-
tions in a language that can be applied to others.9 Strawson explains
6. While other characteristics of the morally responsible person might be cited, these
five carry considerable philosophical agreement and rest on mutually supportive
arguments.
7. See, e.g., Daniel Dennett, Conditions of Personhood, in PERSONAL IDENTITY, 175, 191
(Amelia Oskenberg Rorty, ed., 1976).
8. P. F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS, AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS 100 (1959).
9. DONALD DAVIDSON, PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON ACTION AND EVENTS
229-34 (1980).
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that we must see the connection between the first and third person ap-
plication of language.' 0 We must see ourselves as persons like others.
If I correctly describe myself as melancholy or angry, the words "melan-
choly" and "angry" must mean the same things as when applied to
others. Hence, to acquire the ability to apply personal predicates and
descriptions to my own behavior, I must identify others' intentions and
determine these intentions are similar to my own." 1 As Lawrence Blum
notes, self-knowledge cannot be sharply separated from knowledge of
others.' 2 To develop self-descriptive language, a person must be able
to reason about others' intentions and must, in some measure, conceive
of him or herself as a person among persons with motives and intentions
like others' to develop any language to describe his own actions.
The "first person criteria," the criteria for applying words describ-
ing conscious states, must correlate with the "third person criteria," the
criteria for words describing the same states in others. This ability to
conceive of oneself and other persons must be a matter of degree. It
does not come to everyone all at once or in equal amounts. Some emo-
tions and intentions are understood by the very young while others re-
quire more human relations and world experience. A toddler may
recognize anger or hurt, while only more mature persons can correctly
identify and describe jealousy or ambition in themselves and others. We
are (and should be) held responsible in various degrees, partially be-
cause we are capable of understanding ourselves and others in various
degrees that change as we acquire a clearer conception of ourselves and
others through acquiring language. In learning language, an individual
must be interested in, and attentive, to other persons, for it is from
those persons that the individual acquires the language with which to
describe feelings and situations.
The third characteristic concerns the ability to describe motives in
language understandable to the community. Some words we learn to
describe states of mind are words by which we ascribe motives and give
general reasons, words that must have the same meaning for others as
for ourselves. For example, in order to describe my own penitence or
impartiality, we must know how those terms are tied into others' inten-
tions and actions. To learn these words, we must (1) understand others'
intentions; (2) compare these intentions and motives with our own; (3)
master language to describe actions; (4) give reasons for these actions
and (5) compare these reasons with others' reasons. Once again, self-
knowledge is tied to attention to, and knowledge of, others.
The fourth characteristic concerns an individual's ability to compare
reasons, to know what are good reasons and evaluate those reasons. To
be accepted as adequate, reasons must be relevant to the conclusion
reached and proceed from morally acceptable motives. By our common
10. STRAWSON, supra note 8, at 100.
11. Lawrence Blum, Particularity and Responsiveness, in THE EMERGENCE OF MORAL-




understanding, if we are correctly described as acting responsibly, our
reasons for acting must be acceptable to impartial judges generally. To
understand the reasons for acting, actions must be described in general,
intelligible terms. But a central feature of understanding actions is un-
derstanding whether the action is permissible in society. Until an indi-
vidual recognizes whether actions are acceptable to others in the moral
community, an understanding of the true effect of these actions is in-
complete. An individual must view these actions as an impartial specta-
tor to acquire and correctly use moral language in order to articulate
actions as permissible. Until this language is mastered, one cannot de-
scribe or clarify one's own purposes or plans of action.
It follows that a person who projects responsible plans of action,
must to some degree, master the moral language with its matrix of ac-
ceptable reasons and permissible actions. A person does not under-
stand the language of reasons until he or she learns how the reasons
apply and how the acts and reasons supporting them are perceived as
affecting others and oneself. Thus, once again, moral reasons rest on
the language of self-description, which requires a conception of oneself
as a person among persons with the ability to focus alternately on his or
her own and others' interests and purposes.
Some might object to this argument by asserting that we cannot
know that this quest for moral reasons is indeed universal for all cul-
tures. While it is common enough in our own culture for people to be
ignorant of their reasons for acting, nonetheless, we agree that people
should have relevant reasons. If someone fails to give a reason for hit-
ting another or the reason is irrelevant (e.g., "I hit him because his eyes
are green"), our culture will not accept the action as valid. The action
must be suited to the situation and the supporting reasons relevant to
the situation in order for the reasons to be adequate. Otherwise, we
blame the persons for their inadequate reasons.
The concept of blaming is part of every human culture and involves
the giving of reasons. When we blame someone, we judge that individ-
ual as having acted wrongly in some identifiable particular. Whoever
blames (with adequate reason) must be able to identify the particular
feature that makes the act wrong and give reasons in support of the
blaming judgment. Whoever cannot identify the specific feature that
makes an action wrong has not made a clear or reliable judgment. To be
valid reasons, their relevance must be clear to members of the general
community. Giving and assessing reasons are features of every cul-
ture;13 the characteristics necessary to give and assess reasons must
equally be a feature of our moral anatomy.
Agreement as to others' moral reasons involves agreement as to
13. See Richard Shweder, Elliot Turiel, and Nancy Much, The Aoral Intuitions of the
Child, in SOCIAL COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: FRONTIERS AND POSSIBLE FUTURES (John Flavell
and Lee Ross, eds., 1981).
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their motives and intentions. Thomas Nagel and Richard Peters' ex-
plain how those whose motives we accept as responsible are those who
exhibit some concern for others. These observations are similar to Her-
bert Fingarette's description of responsibility as a specific kind of care.
15
Theorists, such as Roger Beehler, note the link between caring for
others and prescriptive moral language' 6-that is, specific criteria for
moral language exists and these criteria include the requirement of car-
ing about one another, just as specific criteria exist for language describ-
ing colors (such as "red"). Thus, caring is a central factor in moral
reasoning. To be acceptable, our reasons must, at a minimum, indicate
we have considered others. We must know how others view a situation
and what motives they will accept. We must recognize what it means to
be a person in the process of communicating about and judging our and
others' actions.
On one hand, the notion of "good reasons" implies the notion of a
community of moral reasoners whose agreement gives at least a prima
facie sanction of one's judgment. On the other hand, "good reasons"
implies the notion of acceptable motives, or acting out of deference or
concern for others' desires and intentions. Although some theorists ar-
gue all our motives are selfish, our language condemning selfishness
shows that one's motives in acting will not, as a rule, be acceptable if
one shows no concern for how one's acts undermine others' interests.
The component of selfishness will be condemned, perhaps as "heed-
less" or "greedy," perhaps as "callous" or "ruthless," but condemned
in any case.
Moreover, as many have argued, to act voluntarily to protect others'
moral rights, some concern must be shown for those whose rights are
protected. A morally responsible person takes his or her self-description
from society, responding to its demands as reflected in its moral lan-
guage. Choosing one's identity in this way is an expression of regard for
its members. Having concern for others and seeing oneself as a person
among persons must, in some degree, be with us from infancy. It is part of
the process by which we become morally responsible. Without concern
and attention to others' interests, children could not learn language with
which to describe their situation. Without the language, they could not
achieve self-knowledge nor offer reasons in support of their choices.
Thus, in a language-using and reason-giving community, mutual aware-
ness and concern must pervade moral relationships.
Toddlers must learn to use the moral language. Infants possess this
reciprocating awareness and interest in others as observed in their earli-
est learning of social relationships. This awareness and interest-the
abilities and responses of an infant-are vividly suggested in the follow-
ing description by the father of a newborn:
14. THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970); RICHARD PETERS, REASON
AND COMPASSION (1973).
15. HERBERT FINGARETrE, ON RESPONSIBILITY (1967).
16. ROGER BEEHLER, MORAL LIFE 32 (1978).
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Thirty minutes after her birth, my daughter was already taking
my measure. She lay in my lap, startlingly alert, scanning me
as I scanned her, our gazes moving about each other's bodies,
limbs, faces, eyes, returning, then locking. The same thing
happened, I soon noticed, as she lay cradled in my wife's em-
brace, this locking of gaze into gaze. And it was only gradually
that the wondrous mystery of that exchange began to impress
me-for even an hour ago my daughter's eyes had been
sheathed in undifferentiated obscurity-and now what captured
their attention? Other sets of eyes . . . of all the possible ob-
jects of attention, what is so naturally compelling about two
dark pools of returned attention.
17
Observations of infants show a parallel kind of interest.
Part of our fun and our philosophical interest in baby-watching
comes from seeing an infant's delight and excitement grow with the ap-
pearance of its mother, perhaps beginning to cackle and to pedal its feet
in the air, as she engages its eyes, and then seeing the delight with which
it imitates her moves. Our fun comes in witnessing their communication
and in seeing the baby's demonstration of its awareness of its mother
and its delight in her. Our philosophical interest is drawn to its concern
for her and its lively interest in others, but it is especially drawn to the
baby's delight in entering into little games with its mother and others.
For in order to play a game, a baby must recognize what the other person
is up to, what kind of rule is to be followed.
We may feel our own observations are inconclusive because we can-
not be sure we are reflecting on the same kind of mother-child in-
terchange. But if there is doubt on that score, we can turn to some of
the filmed studies that have been used in support of attachment the-
ory. 18 In these studies, mothers are filmed playing with and caring for
their babies. In one such study-an extensive one-the mother-child
relationship was filmed during the first twenty weeks of the infants' lives.
From studying the films, the authors report that, from the first, the
mother takes on facial expressions, motions and postures indicative of
emotion, as though she and her baby were communicating . . . Most
mothers, in sum, are unwilling or unable to deal with neonatal behaviors
as though they were meaningless. 19 But of course, if the earlier dis-
cussed Piaget-Kohlberg view were correct, 20 infants' behavior would be
17. Talk of the Town, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 9, 1987, at 25.
18. "Attachment theory" is perhaps too grand a term; it consists of a series of studies
begun by John Bowlby, and taken up by Mary Ainsworth and her followers, which show
how infants become "attached" or psychically bonded to loving caretakers. Mary Ains-
worth's account of how an infant's pattern of behavior comes to form a system, in which a
securely attached child of 12 months takes its caregiver as a base for explorations, sharing
and growth. See MARY AINSWORTH, PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT (1978). See also ATTACHMENT
IN THE PRE-SCHOOL YEARS: THEORY, RESEARCH AND INTERVENTION (Mark Greenberg, Dante
Cicchetti and Mark Cummings, eds., 1990).
19. T. Berry Brazelton, B. Kosloski & M. Main, Otigins of Reciprocit in THE EFFECTS OF
THE INFANT ON THE CARE GIVER 49 (Michael Lewis and Leonard Rosenblum, eds., 1974).
20. 1 KOHLBERG, supra note 1, at 118.
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meaningless in the sense that it could involve no mutual caring relation-
ship between caretaker and infant.
The account of the filmed study continues, describing how the
mother's treatment initiates a reciprocal caring relationship with the in-
fant through which it learns to play, and hence, communicate. The
mother treats her time with the infant as a time for communicating, ad-
justing the complexity of her behavior to fit the infant's stage of devel-
opment. She presents behavior as a model for the infant. She imitates
its activity, enlarging upon it, and it delightedly enters into the play.
Thus the infant "becomes aware of his action, visualizing her imitation
of it and reproduces it for himself again. As he does so, he has the op-
portunity to add on to it... (in part) by modelling his behavior to match
the enlarged version."' 2 1 After observing mothers with their newborns
over a 20-week period, the authors concluded that both mother and child
were learning rules for their interaction, rules "which were being con-
stantly altered by each."
22
In films of infant attachment made by the investigators, we see that
the child's capacity for seeing what its mother is doing and responding
to it requires that the child see her intent and reciprocate, knowing she
will see its intent and respond to it: reciprocity and taking the view of
the other is essential to the play. Theirs is a kind of game in which the
mother does this, the infant does that, then the mother does another
thing (in accord with a pattern), or it might be a case of imitation in
which if the mother does this, then the infant does this also. In either
case, there is a kind of rule generation involved in the communication:
the infant knows how to take the mother's intention, knows what she has
in mind for it and knows that she will also know how to take what it does.
So the infant must have an awareness of its behavior as falling under
what it takes to be intended for it. Thus, contrary to what Piaget and
Kohlberg would lead us to expect, at the age of four weeks (when one
can definitely say that such play begins) we see, in primitive form, the
abilities that are described as necessary to moral personhood in the phil-
osophical literature-down to and including the beginnings of self-con-
sciousness. The infant's self-consciousness is not consciousness of
behavior as falling under a verbal description that is known to the infant,
but it is consciousness which it uses in its game with its mother and on
which it builds in subsequent play and learning.
Both parties possessed a consuming interest in the other partner to
the play. Investigators report that in looking at films of four-week-old
infants, they could look at any segment of the infant's body shown on
the film and detect whether he was watching an object or interacting
with his mother because the child's attention was quite different if vocal-
izing, smiling and using motor behavior in response to inanimate stimu-
lus as opposed to the mother.2 3 Thus, we find in primitive form, not
21. Brazelton, supra note 19, at 74.
22. Id. at 73.
23. Id. at 53.
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only the ability to gain insight into another's desires and intentions (re-
quired for moral reasoning), but also the understanding of intentions,
an indication of the concern for others that enters into moral motiva-
tion, according to the foregoing account of our moral anatomy. The
infant's consuming interest in others appears at a time when the infant
could not calculate what would serve its own future interests: the inter-
est it exhibits is in others' delight and response. Moreover, the con-
cern-the interest and delight in others' activity and responses-is an
important factor in the mother-child games in which the infant begins to
develop moral capacities. The games begin and attachment is formed
through the infant's first interest in others, which is apparently height-
ened because of mother-child games. In those interchanges we observe
its first exercise of capacities that will be required in order for it to de-
velop rational competence. Thus, the interest shown in others is not a
lapse from some rational calculation of self-interest. The interest, the
responsiveness, must be there for the reasoning to begin. It is in us
from the beginning, waiting to be channeled into the many determinate
kinds of concern and respect that figure in moral action and reasoning.
Such interchanges mark peaks of cognitive performances for an in-
fant of under six months old. But the child builds on that beginning.
Other studies, made of children from six months to one year old, show
during that period the child is more likely to become involved in activi-
ties turning on such reciprocity and mutuality. 24 If given a caring envi-
ronment during this time, it will be likely to be working out what a
number of investigators describe as a secure attachment. This attach-
ment is characterized by the child's preference for its caretaker, shown
by its heightened interest directed toward her or him and by the fre-
quency with which it takes care to establish eye contact with her or him.
It is also characterized by its initiating interchanges with the caregiver
and by what investigators describe as trust.
Our philosophical interest in attachment is drawn to the point that
the child can only become attached through an already present respon-
siveness and ability to read others' intentions. It is as a result of the
attachment that it moves toward limited autonomy and independent sat-
isfaction in its activities and becomes more responsive toward others. A
number of observers of child development support these conclusions
and suggest the child's relation to other members of the family is crucial
to that development. Martin Hoffman is among those who have called
attention to toddlers' ability to take an interest in, and to interpret,
others' intentions. He noted that very young children are able to learn
about social rules through conversations between family members
about their feelings and inner states.2 5 Judy Dunn reports that two-
year-olds grow in their ability to anticipate others' feelings, to under-
24. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
25. Martin Hoffman, Empathy, Role-Taking, Guilt and the Development ofAltruistic Motives
in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH & SOCIAL ISSUES 124 (T.
Likona ed., 1976).
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stand others' intentions and to understand and communicate about so-
cial rules. She observes that such children ... take part in conversations
about others' feelings in the second year; they play and show interest in
the cause of such feelings. While they are not able to make judgments
about complicated hypothetical moral dilemmas, she writes "they are
very close to being able to assign responsibility for family transgres-
sions, to make choices about whom to support in family disagreements
and to use this understanding .".."26 Moreover, their preparedness to
act out of concern for others seems not to be a matter of fixed phases or
stages, as both Piaget and Kohlberg claim, but is instead related to the
concern exhibited by other members of their family. Dunn notes that as
parents were more intense in their concern in discussing the importance
of not hurting others, children were more likely subsequently to be
sympathetically aroused and helpful in response to others' distress.
Then too, she finds that toddlers with close, affectionate relations with
their siblings show an earlier development of the ability to role-play, to
act as conciliator and to cooperate with others.
Thus, family members' concern about others and their feelings for
the child are instrumental in introducing the child to a sense of member-
ship in the larger moral community. The family's interest in providing
moral education is an important feature of the child's moral develop-
ment from infancy. A philosophical perspective on child development
that focuses on a child's learning and using moral language will hold
that a child comes to apprehend moral meaning through observing and
using moral language in action, a process that can only take place
through its entering into relationships of mutual concern in the moral
community. It must learn what it means to share and to wait one's turn.
The evidence of attachment theory and of other observers support this
view. Attachment theory evidence suggests, contrary to much of the
psychological opinion of the past, that a child's earliest human relation-
ships (as well as its subsequent learning) are made possible by its con-
cern for others and its awareness of their concern and their intentions
both for itself and for others. 2 7 Other psychologists observing child de-
velopment now report that a toddler exhibits the responsiveness that
moral relations require-in the ability to see itself as like others, as a
person among persons. It is worth noting that the toddler can do so
because members of its family have insisted on it entering into moral
relationships; by insisting that it not hurt others, that it share, that it wait
its turn, that it respect others' rights.
On the other hand, the fact that abused and neglected infants often
fail to develop (if they survive) or develop into violent and aggressive
children indicates that the process of moral development is a fragile
one, one where timing is all important.
One of the most essential elements of family life is the caretakers'
26. Judy Dunn, The Beginnings of loral Understanding, in THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY
IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra, note 11, at 91-110.
27. See generall AINSWORTH, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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evident concern about others' rights and their fair treatment: their lov-
ing, consistent, and stable nurturing and their introduction of the child
into their micro community of mutual respect and concern. As the de-
velopment process is shown to be fragile and timing critically important,
let us hope the law attends to those elements.
As I have no training in the law, I am not competent to proceed
from these points to suggest specific changes which should be made in
law or court procedure. But speaking broadly, I, or anyone, can men-
tion some of the more important points which are indicated. The timing
and fragility of a young child's moral development mean that we have
stronger reasons for providing for its moral development than we have
for either parent's custodial rights. The courts must work within a small
window of time. Clearly it cannot postpone providing for the child's
interests in favor of its parents whose claims are more forcefully
presented by their lawyers.
Indeed, unless parents can provide the requisite consistent, loving,
nurturing moral guidance, there is no reason they should be considered
to be eligible for custodial rights. The foregoing implies that the family's
importance to the child's best interests is its ability to provide the requi-
site conditions and the parents' biological relationship to the child is
irrelevant to their being able to provide an acceptable claim to the cus-
tody of the child. It seems clear the law's definition of "family" should
be shaped around that point.
As no prospective caretakers could produce decisive evidence that
they would be able to provide such care on a continuing basis, there is
no reason for treating custody decisions as single, final decisions.
Rather, they are matters which require monitoring and continuing re-
view. Moreover, the monitoring can only be intelligently reviewed by
someone who understands the complexity of the developmental pro-
cess and its relation to family life. Thus, special qualifications of educa-
tion and training should be attached to the position of family court
judges or to whatever court officer is empowered to review and decide
such cases: we require a whole new set of criteria of eligibility for family
court judges or the court officers to whom such authority is delegated.
2 8
28. I do not propose that these are all of the changes which need to be made, but they
are the substantive ones. These changes are essential to providing for the well-being of
children whose destinies are affected by courts' decisions.
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